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Networks - Incident Handling

Incident Handling Guide

1. Definition of Adverse Event and Computer Security Incident
2. Need for Incident Response
3. Handling an Incident - Preparation
4. Handling an Incident - Detection and Analysis
5. Handling an Incident - Containment, Eradiation, and Recovery
6. Checklists for Handling Incidents
7. Recommendations of the NIST, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, Publication 800-61

1. Definition of Adverse Event and Computer Security Incident

An event is any observable occurrence in a system or network. Adverse Events are events with a negative consequence, such as system crashes, network packet floods, unauthorized use of system privileges, defacement of a Web page, and execution of malicious code that destroys data. Computer Security Incident, hereafter referred to as incident, can be thought of as a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices. Examples of incidents are:

  • Denial of Service
  • Malicious Code
  • Unathorized Access
  • Inappropriate Usage
  • Multiple Component

2. Need for Incident Response

Incident Response has become necessary because attacks frequently cause the compromise of personal and business data. These events make the case daily for responding quickly and efficiently when computer security defenses are breached. The benefits of having an incident response capability:

  • Responding to incidents systematically so that the appropriate steps are taken
  • Helping personnel to recover quickly and efficiently from security incidents, minimizing loss or theft of informatin and disruption of services
  • Using information gained during incident handling to better prepare for handling future incidents and to provide stronger protection for systems and data
  • Dealing properly with legal issues that may arise during incidents

3. Handling an Incident - Preparation and Prevention

The preparation phase involves establishing and training an incident response team and acquiring the necessary tools and resources. During preparation, CWU also attempts to prevent incidents that will occur by using industry standard recommended practices for securing networks, systems and applications such as:

  • Patch Management for all systems
  • Host-based Security
    • Perform regular vulnerability assessments to identify serious risks and mitigate the risks to an acceptable level
    • Disable all unneeded services on hosts
    • Run services with the least privileges possible to reduce the immediate impact of successful exploits
    • Use host-based firewall software
    • Limit unauthorized physical access to logged-in systems by requiring hosts to lock idle screens automatically
    • Regularly verify the permission settings for critical resources, including password files, sensitive databases and public Web pages
  • Web Server Security
  • Network Security (Internal and External Firewalling)
    • Configure network perimeter to deny all incoming and outgoing traffic that is not expressly permitted:
      • Blocking the usage of services that no longer serve a legitimate purpose and are used in DoS attacks
      • Perform egress and ingress filtering
      • Blocking traffic from unassigned IP address ranges, known as bogon lists
      • Writing and sequencing firewall rules and router ACLs to block traffic
      • Configuring border routers not to forward directed broadcasts
      • Limiting incoming and outgoing ICMP traffic to only the necessary types and codes
      • Blocking outgoing connections to common IRC, peer-to-peer service and instant messaging where needed
    • Implement rate limiting for certain protocols so they can only consume a designated percentage of total bandwith
    • On Internet-accessible hosts, disable all unneeded services and restrict the use of services that may be used DoS attacks
    • Implement DoS prevention software such as Mazu Networks' Enforcer
    • Implement redundancy for key functions (e.g., multiple firewalls, Web servers)
    • Ensure that networks and systems are not running near maximum capacity or it could be easy for a minor DoS attack to take up the remaining resources
    • Properly secure all remote access methods, including modems and VPNs
    • Put all publicly accessible services on secured DMZ network
    • Use private IP addresses for all hosts on internal networks.
  • Malicious Code Prevention
    • Read antivirus bulletins
    • Eliminate open Windows shares
  • User Awareness Training
  • Configure email servers so they cannot be used for mail relaying
  • Implement spam filtering on all email servers
  • Run antivirus software and keep it updated
  • Use intrusion detection software
  • Configure all hosts to use centralized logging and event correlation software
  • Establish password policy that requires users change passwords, complexity level, reuse, etc.
  • Use outages distribution lists, outages notifications on Intranets, and CVS for change management information (e.g., system shutdowns, configuration changes, routine system administrative tasks)

Some tools and resources available for incident handling:

Incident Handler Communications and Facilities
  • Contact information for team members, other systems/networks managers, applications staff, law enforcement, etc. including phone numbers, email addresses, etc.
  • Incident reporting mechanisms, such as phone numbers, email addresses and online forms that users can use to report suspected incidents
  • Pagers or cell phones to be carried by team members for off-hour support, onsite communications
  • Encryption software to be used for communications among team members, within the organization and with external parties
  • War room for central communications and coordination
  • Secure storage facility for securing evidence and other sensitive materials
Incident Analysis Hardware and Software
  • Computer forensic workstations and/or backup devices to create disk images, preserve log files, save other relevant incident data
  • Laptops which provide easily portable workstations for activities such as analyzing data, sniffing packets, and writing reports
  • Spare workstations, servers, and networking equipment which may be used for restoring backups, trying out malicious code, test lab, etc.
  • Blank media such as CD-Rs and DVD-Rs
  • Easily portable printer to print copies of log files and other evidence from non-networked systems
  • Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers to capture and analyze network traffice that may contain evidence of an incident
  • Computer forensic software to analyze disk images for evidence
  • CDs with trusted versions of programs to be used to gather evidence from systems
  • Evidence gathering accessories, notebooks, digital cameras, audio recorders, chain of custody forms, evidence storage bags and tags and tape to preserve for possible legal actions
Incident Analysis Resources
  • Port Lists, including commonly used ports and Trojan horse ports
  • Documentation for OSs, applications, protocols, and intrusion detection and antivirus signatures
  • Network diagrams and lists of critical assets, such as Web, email, servers
  • Baselines of expected network, system and application activity
  • Cryptographic hashes of critical files to speed the analysis, verification and eradication of incidents
Incident Mitigation Software
  • Media, including OS boot disks and CD-ROMs, OS media and application media
  • Security patches from OS and application vendors
  • Backup images of OS, applications and data stored on secondary media

4. Handling an Incident - Detection and Analysis

Incident Categories. Incidents can occur in countless ways so it is impractical to develop comprehensive procedures with step-by-step instructions for handling every incident. The best we can do is to prepare generally to handle any type of incident and more specifically to handle common incident types:

  • Denial of Service - an attack that prevents or impairs the authorized use of networks, systems or applications by exhausting resources
    • Reflector Attack: a host sends many requests with a spoofed source address to a service on an intermediate host. (The service used is typically UDP based.)
    • Amplifier Attack: like a reflector attack only the goal is to use a whole network of intermediate hosts. (The service sends an ICMP or UDP request to an expected broadcase address hoping that many hosts will receive the broadcast and respond to it.)
    • Distributed Denial of Service Attacks: Coordinated attack among many computers.
    • Synfloods: The attacker initiates many TCP connections in a short time (by sending SYN packets) but does not complete the TCP three-way handshakes necessary to complete the connection.
  • Malicious Code - a virus, worm, Trojan horse or other code-based malicious entity that infects a host
    • File Infector Viruses: attach themselves to executable programs such as word processors, spreadsheets, then propagate to infect other programs on the system. (Jerusalem and Cascade are two of the best- known file infector viruses.)
    • Boot Sector Viruses: Infects the master boot record of a hard drive or the boot sector of removable media. Symptoms include an error message during boot or cannot boot. (Form, Michelangelo and Stoned are boot sector viruses.)
    • Macro Viruses: The most prevalent and successful type of virus. They attach themselves to documents such as word processing files and spreadsheets. A macro virus uses an application's macro programming language to execute and propagate. (Concept, Marker and Melissa are well-know macro viruses.)
    • Virus Hoaxes: False virus warnings. Typically circulated by innocent end users who believe they are helping by distributing to the Internet community. (Good Times and Bud Frogs are widely distributed hoaxes.)
    • Trojan Horses: Programs that appear to be benign but actually have a hidden malicious purpose. They tend to fit into one of three models:
      1. Continuing to perform the function of the original program and additinally performing a separate malicious activity.
      2. Continuing to perform the function of the original program but modifying the function to perform malicious activity.
      3. Performing a malicious function that completely replaces the function of the original program.
    • Worms: Self-replicating programs that are completely self-contained, they do not require a host program to infect a victim. (Blaster and SQL Slammer are popular worms.)
    • Mobile Code: software that is transmitted from a remote system to a local system and then executed on the local system without the user's explicit instruction. Often acts as a mechanism for a virus, worm or Trojan horse to be transmitted to the user's workstation. Popular vehicles for mobile code are Java applets, ActiveX, JavaScript and VBScript.
    • Blended Attack: An instance of malicious code that uses multiple methods to spread. The well-known Nimda "worm" used email, windows shares, web servers and web clients to distribute itself.
  • Unauthorized Access - a person gains logical or physical access without permission to a network, system, application, data or other resource. Some examples include:
    • Performing a remote root compromise of an email server
    • Defacing a Web server
    • Guessing and cracking passwords
    • Copying a database containing credit card numbers
    • Viewing sensitive data such as payroll records or medical information, without authorization
    • Running a packet sniffer on a workstation to capture usernames and passwords
    • Using a permission error on an anonymous FTP server to distribute pirated software and music files
    • Dialing into an unsecured modem and gaining internal network access
    • Posing as an executive, calling the helpdesk, resetting th4e executive's email password and learning the new password
    • Using an unattended, logged-in workstation without permission
  • Inappropriate Usage - a person violates acceptable use policies. examples of inappropriate use include users who:
    • Download password cracking tools or pornography
    • Send spam promoting a personal business
    • Email harassing messages to coworkers
    • Use file or music sharing services to acquire or distribute pirated materials
    • Set up an unauthorized Web site on one of the organization's computers
    • Transfer sensitive materials from the organization to external locations
  • Multiple Component - a single incident that encompases two or more incidents

Detection. Signs of an incident fall into two categories: indications and precursors. A precursor is a sign that an incident may occur in the future. An indication is a sign that an incident may have occurred or may be occurring now. Some precursor or indication sources:

  • Network and host-based IDS
  • Antivirus software
  • File integrity checking software
  • Third-party monitoring service
  • Operating system, service and application logs
  • Network device logs
  • Information on new vulnerabilities and exploits
  • Information on incidents at other organizations
  • People from within the organization
  • People from other organizations

DoS attacks can be detected through particular precursors and indications, primarily those listed in the table below:

Malicious ActionPossible Indications
Network-based DoS against a particular host
  • User reports of system unavailability
  • Unexplained connection losses
  • Network intrusion detection alerts
  • Host intrusion detection alerts (until the host is overwhelmed)
  • Increased network bandwidth utilization
  • Large number of connections to a single host
  • Asymmetric network traffic pattern (large amount of traffic going to the host, little traffic coming from the host)
  • Firewall and router log entries
  • Packets with unusual source addresses
Network-based DoS against a network
  • User reports of system and network unavailability
  • Unexplained connection losses
  • Network intrusion detection alerts
  • Increased network bandwidth utilization
  • Asymmetric network traffic pattern (large amount of traffic entering the network, little traffic leaving the network)
  • Firewall and router log entries
  • Packets with unusual source addresses
  • Packets with nonexistent destination addresses
DoS against the operating system of a particular host
  • User reports of system and application unavailability
  • Network and host intrusion detection alerts
  • Operating system log entries
  • Packets with unusual source addresses
DoS against an application on a particular host
  • User reports of application unavailability
  • Network and host intrusion detection alerts
  • Application log entries
  • Packets with unusual source addresses

Malicious code attacks can be detected through particular precursors and indications, primarily those listed in the table below:

Malicious ActionPossible Indications
A virus that spreads through email infects a host
  • Antivirus software alerts of infected files
  • Sudden increase in the numgber of emails being sent and received
  • Changes to templates for word processing documents, spreadsheets, etc.
  • Deleted, corrupted or inaccessible files
  • Unusual items on the screen, such as odd messages and graphics
  • Programs start slowly, run slowly or do not run at all
  • System instability and crashes
  • If the virus achieves root-level access, see table for Unauthorized Access for "Root compromise of a host"
A worm that spreads through a vulnerable service infects a host
  • Antivirus software alerts of infected files
  • Port scans and failed connection attempts targeted at the vulnerable service (e.g., open Windows shares, HTTP)
  • Increased network usage
  • Programs start slowly, run slowly or do not run at all
  • System instability and crashes
  • If the virus achieves root-level access, see table for Unauthorized Access for "Root compromise of a host"
A Trojan horse is installed and running on a host
  • Antivirus software alerts of Trojan horse versions of files
  • Network intrusion detection alerts of Trojan horse client-server communications
  • Firewall and router log entries for Trojan horse client-server communications
  • Network connections between the host and unknown remote systems
  • Unusual and unexpected ports open
  • Unknown processes running
  • High amounts of network traffic generated by the host, particularly if directed at external host(s)
  • Programs start slowly, run slowly or do not run at all
  • System instability and crashes
  • If the Trojan horse achieves root-level access, see table for Unauthorized Access for "Root compromise of a host"
Malicious mobile code on a Web site is used to infect a host with a virus, worm or Trojan horse
  • Indications listed above for the pertinent type of malicious code
  • Unexpected dialog boxes, requesting permission to do something
  • Unusual graphics, such as overlapping or overlaid message boxes
Malicious mobile code on a Web site exploits vulnerabilities on a host
  • Unexpected dialog boxes, requesting permission to do something
  • Unusual graphics, such as overlapping or overlaid message boxes
  • Sudden increase in the number of emails being sent and received
  • Network connections between the host and unknown remote systems
  • If the mobile code achieves root-level access, see table for Unauthorized Access for "Root compromise of a host"
A user receives a virus hoax message
  • Original source of the message is not an authoritative computer security group, but a government agency or an important official person
  • No links to outside sources
  • Tone and terminology attempt to invoke panic or a sense of urgency
  • Urges recipients to delete certain files and forward the message to others

Unauthorized Access Indications:

Malicious ActionPossible Indications
Root compromise of a host
  • Existence of unauthorized security-related tools or exploits
  • Unusual traffic to and from the host (e.g., attacker may use the host to attack other systems)
  • System configuration changes, including-
    • Process/Service modifications or additions
    • Unexpected open ports
    • System status changes (restarts, shutdowns)
    • Changes to log and audit policies and data
    • Network interface card set to promiscuous mode (packet sniffing)
    • New administrative-level user account or group
  • Modifications of critical files, timestamps and privileges, including executable programs, OS kernels, system libraries, and configuration and data files
  • Unexplained account usage (e.g., idel account in use, account in use from multiple locations at once, unexpected commands from a particular user, large number of locked-out accounts)
  • Significant changes in expected resource usage (e.g., CPU, network activity, full logs or file systems)
  • User reports of system unavailability
  • Network and host intrusion detection alerts
  • New files or directories with unusual names
  • Highly unusual operating system and application log messages
  • Attacker contacts the organization to say that he or she has compromised a host
Unauthorized data modification
  • Network intrusion detection alerts
  • Increased resource utilization
  • User reports of data modification (e.g., defaced Web site)
  • Modifications to critical files (e.g., Web pages)
  • New files or directories with unusual names
  • Significant changes in expected resource usage
Unauthorized usage of standard user account
  • Access attempts to critical files (e.g., password files)
  • Unexplained account usage
  • Web proxy log entries showing the download of hacker tools
Physical intruder
  • User reports of network or system unavailability
  • System status changes (restarts, shutdowns)
  • Hardware is completely or partially missing
  • Unauthorized new hardware
Unauthorized data access
  • Intrusion detection alerts of attempts to gain access to the data through FTP, HTTP and other protocols
  • Host-recorded access attempts to critical files

Some Inappropriate Usage Indications are listed in the table below:

Inappropriate ActionPossible Indications
Unauthorized service usage (e.g., Web server, file sharing, music sharing)
  • Network intrusion detection alerts
  • Unusual traffic to and from the host
  • New process/software installed and running on a host
  • New files or directories with unusual names
  • Increased resource utilization
  • User reports
  • Application log entries (e.g., Web proxies, FTP servers, email servers)
Access to inappropriate materials
  • Network intrusion detetion alerts
  • User reports
  • Application log entries (e.g., Web proxies, FTP servers, email servers)
  • Inappropriate files on workstations, servers, or removable media
Attack against external party
  • Network intrusion detection alerts
  • Outside party reports
  • Network, host and applicaion log entries

Incident analysis is difficult to do as not every precursor or indication is guaranteed to be accurate. The following recommendations for making incident analysis easier and more effective:

  • Profile Networks and Systems
  • Understand Normal Behaviors
  • Use Centralized Logging and Create a Log Retention Policy
  • Perform Event Correlation
  • Keep All Host Clocks Synchronized
  • Maintain and Use a Knowledge Base of Information
    • Links to malicious code and hoax information; the most comprehensive and up-to-date sources are typically the major antivirus software vendors
    • Links to lists of domains that hav been blacklisted for sending spam
    • Explanations of significance and validity of precursors and indications, such as intrusions detection alerts, OS log entries and application error codes
  • Use Internet Search Engines for Research
  • Run Packet Sniffers to Collect Additional Data
  • Consider Filtering the Data
  • Consider Experience as Being Irreplaceable
  • Seek Assistance From Others

Incident Documentation. As soon as the incident response team suspects that an incident is occurring or has occurred, it is important to start recording all facts regarding an incident into a logbook. Document system events, telephone conversations, observed changes in files can lead to more efficient, more systematic and less error-prone handling of the problem. Every step taken from the time the incident was detected to its final resolution should be dated and signed by the handler.

The team will maintain records about the status of incidents along with other pertinent information:

  • The current status of the incident
  • A summary of the incident
  • Actions taken by all incident handlers on the incident
  • Contact information for other involved parties (e.g. system owners, sysadmins)
  • A list of evidence gathered during the investigation
  • Comments from handlers
  • Next steps to be taken (e.g. waiting for a sysadmin to patch an application)

Incident Prioritization. Incidents should not be handled on a first-come, first-served basis. Handling will be prioritized on two factors:

  • Current and Potential Technical Effect of the Incident
  • Criticality of the Affected Resources

Incident Notification. After the incident has been analyzed and prioritized, the team will notify the appropriate individuals within the organization and perhaps other organizations.

  • President of the University
  • Director of ITS
  • System owner
  • Legal Department
  • Public Affairs (for incidents that may generate publicity)

5. Handling an Incident - Containment, Eradiation, and Recovery

Containment strategies vary based on the type of incident. Criteria for determining the appropriate strategy include:

  • Potential damage to and theft of resources
  • Need for evidence preservation
  • Service availability (e.g., network connectivity, services provided to external parties)
  • Time and resources needed to implement the strategy
  • Effectiveness of the strategy (e.g., partially contains the incident, fully contains the incident)
  • Duration of the solution (e.g., emergency workaround to be removed in four hours, temporary workaround to be removed in two weeks, permanent solution)

In certain cases, delaying the containment of an incident may be done so monitoring the activity can be done to gather evidence. The team should discuss the delayed containment with the legal team to determine if it is feasible. If a system has been compromised and allows the compromise to continue, it may be liable if the attacker uses the compromised system to attack other systems.

The primary reason for gathering evidence during an incident is to resolve the incident, however, the evidence may be used for legal proceedings. It is important to clearly document how all evidence, including compromised systems, has been preserved. A detailed log should be kept for all evidence, including the following:

  • Identify information (e.g., the location, serial number, model number, hostname, MAC address, and IP address of the computer)
  • Name, title, and phone number of each individual who collected or handled the evidence during the investigation
  • Time and date (including time zone) of each occurrence of evidence handling
  • Locations where the evidence was stored

Computer forensic software is valuable not only for acquiring disk images, but also for automating much of the analysis process, such as:

  • Identifying and recovering file fragments and hidden and deleted files and directories from any location (e.g., used space, free space, slack space)
  • Examining file structures, headers and other characteristics to determine what typoe of data each file contains and not relying on file extensions (e.g.,.doc, .jpg, .mp3)
  • Displaying the contents of all graphics files
  • Performing complex serches
  • Graphically displaying the drive's directory structure
  • Generating reports

During evidence acquisition, it is prudent to acquire copies of supporting log files from other resources- for example, firewall logs that show what IP address an attacker used. Logs should be copied to sanitized write-protectable or write-once media.

During incident handling, system owners typically want to identify the attacker. Although this information can be important, the incident handlers should stay focused on containment, eradication and recovery. Identifying the attacker can be time consuming and futile. The following items are the most commonly performed activities for attacker identification:

  • Validating the Attacker's IP Address
  • Scanning the Attacker's System
  • Researching the Attacker Through Search Engines
  • Using Incident Databases
  • Monitoring Possible Attacker Communication Channels

Eradication and Recovery. After an incident has been contained, eradication may be necessary to eliminate components of the incident, such as deleting malicious code and disabling breached user accounts. See tables below for possible eradication and recovery strategies.

Incident Type Possible Solution
Denial of Service
  • Correct the vulnerability or weakness that is being exploited (e.g, if an unpatched system is susceptible to a DoS then patch the system.)
  • Implement filtering based on the characteristics of the attack (e.g., if the attack is using ICMP echo requests, alter the perimeter secuirty to temporarily block such requests.)
  • Relocate the target (e.g., move the host to a different IP address)
Malicious Code
  • Any of the actions above. If one host has been infected it is highly likely that other systems will be infected so the containment process includes prevention of the spread of malicious code to other systems.
  • Identify and isolate other infected hosts. Antivirus alert messages are a good source of informationk, but not every infection will be detected by antivirus software. Other means of identification are:
    • Performing port scans to detect hosts listening on known Trojan horse or backdoor ports
    • Using antivirus scanning and cleanup tools released to combat a specific instance of malicious code
    • Reviewing logs from email servers, firewalls, and other systems
    • Configuring network and host intrusion detection software to identify activity associated with infections
    • Auditing the processes running on systems to confirm that they are all legitimate
  • Configure email servers and clients to block emails (this is neither foolproof nor an efficient solution, but it may be the best option available if an imminent threat exists and antivirus signatures are not yet available.)
  • Block particular hosts. (e.g., if malicious code attempts to generate outbound emails or connectsion, consider blocking IP addresses or services to which the infected system may be attempting to connect.)
  • Shut down email servers. During the most severe malicious code incidents, with hundreds or thousands of internal hosts infected, email servers may become completely overwhelmed by viruses trying to spread via email.
  • Isolate networks from the Internet. Occasionally a worm will generate so much traffic throughout the Internet that network perimeters are completely overwhelmed.
Unauthorized Access
  • Isolate the affected systems. This prevents the affected systems from being further compromised.
  • Disable the affected service. (e.g., if an attacker is exploiting a FTP vulnerabilitiy and the unauthorized access is limited to the FTP data files, disable the FTP service.)
  • Eliminate the attacker's route into the environment. (e.g., temporary blocking incoming connections to a particular network segment or disconnected a remote access server.)
  • Disable user accounts that may have been used in the attack.
  • Enhance physical security measures. (e.g., if an outsider is suspected of gaining access to a server room, secure the server room.)
Inappropriate Usage Typically require no containment, eradication or recovery actions other than possibly deleting objectional materials or uninstalling unauthorized software. For most incidents, evidence acquisition is important.

6. Checklists for handling incidents.

The following checklist provides major steps to be performed in handling a Denial of Service incident.

Denial of Service Attack Checklist Completed
Detection and Analysis
1. Prioritize handling the incident based on the business impact
1.1
  • Identify which resources have been affected and forecast which resources will be affected
1.2
  • Estimate the current and potential technical effect of the incident
2. Report the incident to the appropriate internal personnel and external organizations
Containment, Eradications, and Recovery
3. Acquire, preserve, secure, and document evidence
4. Contain the incident-halt the D0S if it has not already stopped
4.1
  • Identify and mitigate all vulnerabilities that were used
4.2
  • If not contained, impliment filtering based on the characteristics of the attack, if feasible
4.3
  • If not yet contained, reloate the target
5. Eradicate the incident; if Step 4.1 was not performed, identify and mitigate all vulnerabilities that were used
6. Recover from the incident
6.1
  • Return affected systems to an operationally ready state
6.2
  • If necessary and feasible, implement additional monitoring to look for futer related activity
Post-Incident Activity
7. Create a follow-up report
8. Hold a lessons learned meeting

The following checklist provides major steps to be performed in handling a Malicious Code incident.

Malicious Code Incident Handling Checklist Completed
Detection and Analysis
1. Prioritize handling the incident based on the business impact
1.1
  • Identify which resources have been affected and forecast which resources will be affected
1.2
  • Estimate the current and potential technical effect of the incident
2. Report the incident to the appropriate internal personnel and external organizations
Containment, Eradications, and Recovery
3. Contain the incident
3.1
  • Identify infected systems
3.2
  • Disconnect infected systems from the network
3.3
  • Mitigate vulnerabilities that were exploited by the malicious code
3.4
  • If necessary, block the transmission mechanisms for the malicious code
4. Eradicate the incident
4.1
  • Disinfect, quarantine, delete, and replace infected files
4.2
  • Mitigate the exploited vulnerabilities for other hosts within the organization
5. Recover from the incident
5.1
  • Confirm that the affected systems are functioning normally
5.2
  • If necessary, implement additional monitoring to look for future related activity
Post-Incident Activity
6. Create a follow-up report
7. Hold a lessons learned meeting

The following checklist provides major steps to be performed in handling an Unauthorized Access incident.

Unauthorized Access Incident Handling Checklist Completed
Detection and Analysis
1. Prioritize handling the incident based on the business impact
1.1
  • Identify which resources have been affected and forecast which resources will be affected
1.2
  • Estimate the current and potential technical effect of the incident
2. Report the incident to the appropriate internal personnel and external organizations
Containment, Eradications, and Recovery
3. Perform an initial containment the incident
4. Acquire, preserve, secure and document evidence
5. Confirm the containment of the incident
5.1
  • Further analyze the incident and determine if containment was sufficient (including checking other systems for signs of intrusion)
5.2
  • Implement additional containment measures if necessary
6. Eradicate the incident
6.1
  • Identify and mitigate all vulnerabilities that were exploited
6.2
  • Remove components of the incident from systems
7. Recover from the incident
7.1
  • Return affected systems to an operationally ready state
7.2
  • Confirm that the affected systems are functioning normally
7.3
  • If necessary, implement additional monitoring to look for future related activity
Post-Incident Activity
8. Create a follow-up report
9. Hold a lessons learned meeting

The following checklist provides major steps to be performed in handling an Inappropriate Usage incident.

Inappropriate Usage Incident Handling Checklist Completed
Detection and Analysis
1. Prioritize handling the incident based on the business impact
1.1
  • Determine whether the activity seems criminal in nature
1.2
  • Forecast how severely the organization's reputation may be damaged
2. Report the incident to the appropriate internal personnel and external organizations
Containment, Eradications, and Recovery
3. Acquire, preserve, secure, and document evidence
4. If necessary, contain and eradicate the incident (e.g., remove inappropriate materials)
Post-Incident Activity
5. Create a follow-up report
6. Hold a lessons learned meeting
Contact Information

ITS - Networks
400 E. University Way
Ellensburg, WA 98926
Phone (509) 963-2924
Email: networks@cwu.edu
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