ROADS NOT TAKEN
The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-Century China
edited by
ROGER B. JEANS
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Westview Press
BOULDER, SAN FRANCISCO, & OXFORD
Zenq Qi and the Frozen Revolution

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Writing to his son upon the death of his wife, less than a decade before his own demise, the founder of the Chinese Youth Party (CYP), Zeng Qi (1892-1951), lamented that in thirty years of marriage he had spent limited time with his family. There was no home-style felicity, no family, no self, but just striving for the benefit of the nation. Full of bitter self-reproach, the passage also reflects a lifelong concern with personal destiny and national leadership. With some justification, he felt himself part of an incorruptible intellectual elite. Except under the extreme conditions of foreign invasion, neither the Communist Party (CCP) nor the Guomindang (GMD) could entice him into their ranks. In contrast with many Chinese politicians and reformers, who changed their agendas to include new strategies and fluid objectives, he held fast to his original vision of the CYP. It was this inflexible sense of destiny that provides the keenest insight into the true tragedy of Zeng and the CYP. While the ideology of the CYP was coherent and modern, in terms of Chinese revolutionary realpolitik, Zeng and his compatriots could not totally break with their heritage as intellectuals. Instead, they pursued a revolution which was frozen in the ethos of May Fourth youth activism.

This essay will explore a revolution caught between modern politics and the traditional role of the Chinese intellectual class. The first half will discuss the early commitment of Zeng to the revolution of youth. Resisting his own sympathy for the worker-students in France, he founded the CYP in 1923, as a response to the growing power of Communism within the Chinese community there. The second half will analyze the ideological bases...
of the CYP. Often labeled opportunists or fascists by their competitors, the CYP did in fact have a philosophy which reflected many of the same concerns as the French radical right. This coherent modern ideological platform etches in sharper relief the political incongruities between the desire for modern revolution and the limitations of the traditional intellectual role assumed by Zeng and his cohorts in the CYP.

Zeng Qi and the Formation of the CYP (1923)

Born in Luchang, Sichuan, in 1892, Zeng was part of the transitional generation which enjoyed both Confucian training and the new Western learning. His parents both died before he reached the end of his teenage years. Deciding on an independent course, he often supported himself through journalism.

Attending a Westernized high school in Chengdu, which included among its graduates Wang Guangqi and Li Jieren, he then matriculated at Zhendan (Aurora) University in Shanghai, where he met such lifelong political compatriots as Li Huang and Zuo Shunsheng. Zhendan University was run by French Jesuits, and while he later denounced Western missionaries in China, he obtained a basic grounding in advanced Western learning at the school.2 In 1916, he began a period of study overseas, which, with only one interlude, lasted for almost eight years. Like many Chinese high school and college graduates, he decided to study in Japan. Under increasing nationalistic pressure, however, he returned to China in 1918, where he helped to form the Young China Association (YCA). The proliferation of warlords and the threat of foreign imperialism were incentives for youth to organize during the New Culture Movement (NCM). Zeng was henceforth to see the whole future of China invested in his generation of youth:

Those of the older generation over thirty, with their superficial knowledge of the New Learning, totally exert themselves attaining power on their own behalf (like those returned students who studied in the East and the West). Those of the older generation over fifty, with their corrupt old minds, are vehemently sworn to oppose world trends (like those who want to restore the legacy of the Qing dynasty). Therefore, our generation of youth has no option but to rise up and make our own plans, to break away from the concept of dependency.3

The YCA, informally launched in 1918, was a vibrant part of the NCM. The major figures behind the organization were Zeng, Wang Guangqi, and a nucleus of Sichuan intellectuals, including Li Huang, Chen Yusheng, and Zhou Taixuan. However, the group was also supported by prominent intellectuals from other regions, such as Li Dazhao (who was a founder).4

In an article published in the August 1919 issue of Shaonian Zhongguo (Young China), the goals of the YCA were discussed by Wang Guangqi. It was the harbinger of a cultural revolution in Chinese society which had to precede any serious political revolution. There was the potential of life for the development of a "Young China." First, "Young China" must be creative and not just imitate the past or the West. Second, "Young China" must exercise its social responsibilities and not just base itself on the family system. Mutual systems of support should be developed within society, with a broadening of relationships (for example, between intellectuals and workers). Third, "Young China" must adopt a scientific approach to all facets of reform, as expressed in the Association's motto: "Our association dedicates itself to Social Services under the guidance of the Scientific Spirit, in order to realize our ideal of creating a Young China."5

The YCA served as an important forum for intellectuals in their search for national salvation. With over one hundred members, it published journals in Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai. The journals dealt with issues, such as religious intrusion into Chinese education and the feminist movement, and discussed various theories, such as Marxism.

Another important dimension of the NCM was the Work-Study Movement (WSM), which sent over 1,600 Chinese youth to France between 1919 and 1921. The goal was to work in the undermanned French factories, so that the Chinese youth could study in French schools and obtain technical information to modernize their homeland.6 Zeng was not part of the WSM, but since almost one-third of the YCA members traveled to France, he decided to follow his friends Li Huang and Zhou Taixuan. In fact, the advice of his friends and his desire to pursue overseas studies were included in his rationales for the sojourn in France, and, in contrast to many of the worker-students, he was quite clear that his going was "definitely not to uphold a narrow nationalism."7

He stayed in France from 1919 until 1924. He became an ardent journalist, writing under the pseudonym "Yu Gong" for Xinwen bao (The News), and contributing articles to Liuou zhoukan (Weekly Journal of Students in Europe) and Shaonian Zhongguo (Young China). While not a worker-student, he was interested in worker education and was definitely sympathetic to the increasing problems within the WSM. Showing some influence by the study-scheme heuristic, he wrote an article in 1919 entitled, "What Do Today's Workers Need?" He claimed that the capitalists and politicians could oppress the Chinese people because the latter lacked knowledge. If the workers would read after their factory labor was through for the day, it would provide a basis for modernity from which nothing could
formed the United Federation of Chinese Organizations in France (Zhongguo luFa ge tuanti lianhehui), and between five and six hundred Chinese attended a meeting on 15 July. YCA member He Luzhi presided over this large gathering. Although the assembly was called to organize a strategy for opposing the railroad consolidation scheme, many used it as a forum to espouse their ideas on national salvation. While Zhou Enli's (1898-1976) hour-long speech has drawn the most scholarly attention, Zeng's speech was, in fact, more radical. He proposed to: (1) arouse public opinion; (2) stir up mass movements like the May Fourth Movement; (3) overthrow the corrupt government and institute fundamental reforms in order to restore the momentum of the 1911 Revolution that had been halted by rotten government; and (4) initiate an assassination movement. This last point was clearly the most important aspect of his plan. This speech was an important link with the radical-right platform of the CYP and was not inconsistent with radical-right philosophies espoused in Europe at that time.16

For Zeng, the railroad affair, which ended in successfully blocking foreign control of Chinese railways, was a first and last moment of organizational cooperation with the Communists, who had formed a European Branch of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps (ECYC) and Party (hereafter collectively referred to as ECCO) the year before. Zeng was elected a secretary of the United Federation, along with Zhou, and the finance committee included He Luzhi, an anti-Communist who served alongside the prominent Communist schoolteacher, Xu Teli. Communists occupied over one-third of the committee posts.17

In Zeng's lifetime, 1923 was a turning point. He began the year in illness, restlessly sitting in a sanatorium and outlining schemes in his diary for political activity. It took him an entire year to commit himself to forming the CYP. It was difficult for him to overcome his bias, encouraged by close friends like Wang Guangqi, that to become involved in political parties was a repudiation of the responsibility of the intellectual. However, there were both ideological and personal reasons why he founded the CYP.

First, with his relatively advanced understanding of Western philosophy and culture, he was able to appreciate the diversity of socialist theories. He understood that Lenin's form of Communism was not the only Marxist blueprint. In fact, he and his core of CYP followers--Li Huang, Hu Guowei, and He Luzhi--became devout anti-Communists and regarded the Communist International as an imperialistic arm of the Soviet Union.

Second, he became convinced that nationalism was the ideology to be promoted for the Chinese social revolution. The formation of a political party, led by an enthusiastic nucleus of leaders, was necessary to bring about a fundamental change in Chinese society.
Third, he was particularly dismayed by the increasing success of the ECCO and the growing leadership of Zhou Enlai. In his diary, he claimed that while Zhou, who was then general secretary of the ECYC, used "high-sounding phrases," he nevertheless was full of "a huge amount of empty talk." It was this hostility to Zhou and the ECCO which brings to light the question of personal reasons behind Zeng's decision to form the CYP. It is ironic that one could argue that, in background and temperament, Zhou and Zeng were quite similar. Both were orphaned early, attended Western-oriented educational institutions, and had unfruitful sojourns to Japan; both returned to China for the May Fourth Movement and formed elite youth groups; both went to France not as worker-students (neither worked in the factories), but as journalists; both were concerned with practical and strategic issues, as opposed to reflecting on philosophical points; both kept control of their youth group leadership roles after they reached France; and both became increasingly popular within the Chinese community in France, as indicated by the railroad struggle. In fact, during the latter, they had to cooperate as co-secretaries of the protest committee. Finally, both had numerous personal contacts in common, such as Zhao Shiyuan.

During 1923 and 1924, pressure was brought to bear on Zeng for reconciliation and unification, and several meetings were arranged in cafes between he and Zhou. Sometimes cordial and other times stormy, Zeng would not relent in his anti-Communist stance. Four issues divided the two men. First, as mentioned above, there were significant ideological differences, which should not be underestimated. Second, Zeng favored a regional cohort from Sichuan, while Zhou had broader regional contacts. This may have served as an underlying point of tension for Zeng, to whom issues of regional loyalty were important. Third, Zeng may have felt directly competitive with Zhou, precisely because they had so much in common. It is important not to overlook personal ambition and issues of power. Finally, one might look more deeply at the relationship between Zeng and the only member of the YCA to become a Communist in Europe, Zhao Shiyuan (1901-1927). Zhao, a precocious and brilliant young man, was a protege of Zeng's, although almost ten years younger. Zeng and others were not satisfied when Zhao insisted on keeping within the WSM, and offered to pay his college tuition. Not only was this offer refused, but Zhao became increasingly inclined towards Communism, and, in fact, without his organizational abilities, it is conceivable that the ECCO would not have been formed. This organizational activity required a conscious break with Zeng, his former mentor. Li Huang recounted an extraordinary scene in which a weeping Zhao confided his organizational plans to Zeng in 1922. One of the most important steps in Zhao's increasingly radical commitment was a study group organized by Zhang Shenfu, which Zhou also attended. It is not improbable that, from a personal perspective, Zeng felt animosity toward Zhou and the ECCO for this betrayal by his promising protege, in addition to his own antipathy towards Communism. Thus, it was a strong mixture of ideological and personal reasons that drove Zeng to overcome his scruples and follow through with the difficult decision to establish a political party.

The CYP and the Philosophy of the Radical Right

By the end of 1923, Zeng and his friends had created the CYP. Cleansing the nation of internal factionalism, brought on by warlords, and protecting the nation against invasion by outside forces (neiku guozi, waiyang guoqiang) were essential goals of the new party. To accomplish them, the CYP formulated a program almost synonymous with the integral nationalism espoused by Maurice Barres. The CYP's platform called for the harmonious unity of all classes in pursuit of economic revitalization, as well as a cultural restoration of China's greatness as a civilization. Social reformation would be brought about by an informed society, which would be exposed to an intensive program of national education.

Consciously defining nationalism with European terms, definitions, and examples, the philosopher of the CYP, Li Huang, explained in October 1924 that modern nationalism could only emerge in conflict with foreign pressures, and cited examples such as the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and the mobilization of nationalist forces brought on by the Alfred Dreyfus affair. Much of the essence of nationalism involved the territorial imperative, as well as the nation's spiritual soul. Thus, he defined "nationalism" as a "specific people, occupying a certain piece of land, protecting certain ownership rights." These rights evolved from the shared cultural legacy, as well as the common territorial borders. Mixing the ideas of Confucian filial piety and late nineteenth-century European nationalism, he asserted that it was the responsibility of the descendents of a nation to preserve it, in light of the sacrifices of earlier generations.

From 1923 until 1929, the CYP was a secret party and officially admitted only to being a youth corps. This subterfuge was deemed necessary for self-preservation until the situation in China became mature enough for revolution. However, this did not stop the CYP from aggressively pursuing its political activities. Although Zeng and Li left Paris in September 1924, the political diatribes between the CYP and other groups continued. In addition to attacks and counterattacks in their rival newspapers, several members of the CYP and the ECCO also bought handguns, which they brandished at each other, and several instances of violence occurred at assemblies. Numbering over one hundred members in their first year, the
CYP had some notable successes, especially when the ECCO occupied the Chinese legation in Paris during the May Thirtieth Incident and the CYP provided the French police with the names of the ECCO members involved to be used in expulsion proceedings. This resulted in ECCO leaders such as Ren Zhuxuan, Lin Wei, Deng Xiaoping, and Fu Zhong leaving France.

One of the most damaging charges in the CYP quest for political power was the accusation by their opponents that they were "fascists." This charge was leveled at them as early as 1924 and not just by Communists. The fascist label, in the Chinese context of the early twenties, connoted warlord linkages, violent methods, and aspirations to dictatorship. As proof of the CYP's fascist leanings, the ECCO asserted that the CYP was cooperating with warlords. Epithets such as "running dogs of the warlords" and mentions of warlord connections peppered many of the ECCO anti-CYP critiques. As late as 1930, the journal Chiguang (The Red Light) was still discussing these contacts, accusing the CYP of becoming tools of Wu Peifu.

A more sophisticated critique was offered by the Paris branch of the Chinese Social Democrats, who argued that the ideology of nationalism, especially the territorial nature of the CYP definition (culled from the Nouvelle Larousse Dictionnaire), was one whose highest development resulted in militarism and imperialism, hence fascism. The Social Democrats also, however, emphasized the warlord connections of the CYP.

Zeng Qi initially provided fuel for this fascist appellation by praising Mussolini in a poem and declaring his admiration for the way Italian youth had recently revived their state. Although Zeng felt personally maligned by these attacks, which in May 1927 he termed slander, the example of the efficiency and unity of the Italian fascist state was still cited in party propaganda. However, a 1930 CYP manifesto distanced the Party from fascism in declaring that "the Young China Party is not ashamed to profess that in the love of their motherland, nationalism and fascism do stand on common ground, but the nationalist stands for democracy, while the fascist stands for dictatorship." The taint of fascism and the perception of warlord connections were major factors in undermining support for the CYP.

The issue of fascism in China has been discussed in studies of the GMD, such as William Kirby's work on the relations between China and Germany and Lloyd Eastman's, on the Blue Shirts. Authoritarianism and its place within Chinese tradition and Communist centralized control has also been extensively discussed. However, the CYP never attained any semblance of political control of the nation, and it would be speculative to conjecture about its authoritarian proclivities. Nevertheless, the ideological perspective, organizational ethos, and CYP programs were identical with many central points of European radical-right groups and, in particular, French fascism.

First, the reliance upon youth in the spiritual battle against Communist materialism and for the restoration of national greatness were important elements of the CYP philosophy and agenda, as symbolized by its retention of the word "youth" in the Party name. It also was articulated in its platform: "It falls upon our generation of youth to rise up in a flesh-and-blood struggle with the dark forces..." The platform further stated that the Chinese people only needed the spirit of youth, the will, the confidence, and a national consciousness to overcome the warlords and deal with foreign imperialism. According to Ze'ev Sternhell, these orientations were also prevalent in French fascism:

This dimension of fascism was of great importance. All the revolutionaries--the pure fascists, such as Drieu and Brasillach, who described themselves as such, and fascists like Mauhier, Jouvenel, and Deat, who shrank from the appellation--were agreed on this point: fascism was a revolt against materialism, a revolt of the spirit, the will, the instincts; it was a revolt of youth.

An important rationale of this spiritual, as opposed to materialist, revolution was a regeneration of Chinese culture. It is an interesting contrast that when the ECCO formed their youth branch in mid-1922, they held three days of meetings, with intense argument and genuine debate, whereas the founding meeting of the CYP affirmed a prediscussed platform and structure and was celebrated with traditional Chinese opera songs and classical recitation. Not unnaturally, many of the nationalist writings included arguments from traditional Chinese philosophers. Likewise, according to George L. Mosse, European fascists equated the spiritual nature of the fascist revolution with a cultural resurgence. For the CYP, the cultural restoration meant a strengthening of national social bonds. A common heritage meant a common destiny.

Second, the ideas of nationalism, economic autonomy, and class harmony, as opposed to class struggle, were distinct features of the fascist agenda. One of Zeng's seminal articles, published in October 1924, was entitled, "A Discussion of Central Ideas and Leadership," in which he claimed that a specific political agenda, based on the ideology of nationalism, could unify the country. Guided by new leaders, in particular youth, China could both adopt Western ideas and make significant contributions to the culture of the world, if it were to adopt a centralized nationalism and leadership. A purifying revolution could recapture the greatness of Chinese traditions, and because it included the modern ideology of nationalism, both social and economic inequalities could also be rectified.
for all classes.\textsuperscript{40} As Chen Qitian wrote in 1930, the CYP "does not advocate individualism, clan ideology, tribal ideology, or class ideology but nationalism." The nationalism of the CYP was to enter all levels of society.\textsuperscript{41}

The unifying power of nationalism as the fundamental of modern ideology, the emphasis on creating a structure of national economic autonomy, the opposition to a revolution by the proletariat counterpoised by belief in the concept of class harmony and national unity, and the need for a central leadership were elements espoused by the "Prince of Youth," Maurice Barres, and later fascist ideologues, such as Georges Valois and Marcel Deat.\textsuperscript{42}

Third, resolute anti-Communism also was a strong feature of both CYP and French fascists. As Soucy remarks, "Indeed, French fascist writings sometimes leave the impression that all else was secondary to one primary goal: to mobilize France against communism at home and abroad."\textsuperscript{43} The CYP targeted the Communists as the worst enemies of the modern national revolution. Certainly, their most vehement activities and perhaps most efficacious historical legacy was their active fight in the European arena against the ECCO. As mentioned above, they contributed directly to the expulsions of 1925.

Fourth, the CYP tactical program, such as the advocacy of mass mobilization, the control of public opinion, and the use of violence all reflected methods also espoused by fascist ideologues. That violence was seen as a necessity of the times can be seen from contemporary CYP writings, as well as memoirs. For example, Hu Guowei, who was in charge of CYP "training" in the use of weapons, asserted that practical practice was necessary to deal with Communists and for guerrilla training when they returned to China.\textsuperscript{44} In a passionate public letter written during the furor of the May Thirtieth Incident, Deng Xiaoping, a CYP member, argued for the necessity of military organization to fight against foreign encroachment.\textsuperscript{45}

Fifth, the ethos of the group and the sense of personal loyalties outweighing ideological loyalties was a strong component of the CYP. This loyalty was exemplified by the uncontested leadership of the Party by Zeng until his death in 1951. This was closest to the esprit de corps of the French fascists, who were also similar in their advocacy of an elite group, rather than the German and Italian emphasis on one leader. The CYP was adamantly opposed to dictatorship and would have agreed with the sentiments of Drieu La Rochelle: "There is an appalling weakness in men who give themselves to another man. When there is a dictator, there is no longer an elite; it means that the elite is no longer doing its duty."\textsuperscript{46}

Zeng would have further argued that dictatorship preempts democracy. However, within the Chinese context, elite meant intellectual leadership by the "central leaders" Zeng advocated head the revolution.

Lastly, two contrasting features in the outlooks of the CYP and the European fascists should be noted. First, the CYP lacked a racial basis or discrimination against foreigners. Their denunciation of foreign encroachment into China had a basis in reality and was not the political tactic of finding a scapegoat. Second, there is little evidence to indicate that they were anti-parliamentarian or anti-democratic, a feature of most fascist groups. However, given their traditional stance of personal and group loyalty, it is not clear whether Zeng would have appreciated Western-style pluralism.

Although they never had the opportunity to obtain government control, the ideological platform of the CYP stood for a clear alternative to Chinese politics during the Republican period. In a broader context, their philosophy—which emphasized nationalism, the purity of youth, strong anti-Communism, a nucleus of leaders to preside over a cultural renaissance, and a program of economic autonomy—put them in the mainstream of work politics.

\textbf{Zeng Qi and the Responsibility of the Intellectual}

The case of Zeng and the CYP is important because it raises the generic question of cultural transference in the realm of politics. On the one hand, the CYP political ideology was in tune with the world trend of an upsurge in radical-right politics. In this regard, Zeng was not close to the opportunism of Jacques Doriot—who changed from an avid Communist leader to the organizer of a fascist party—but rather to the integral nationalism of Maurice Barres. On the other hand, the Western concept of the political party was particularly difficult for Chinese intellectuals to adopt as a career role. It was pedagogy, not politics, that was the traditional role of the Chinese leadership. The realms of morality and education were above the narrow confines of political ambition and were seen by many Chinese intellectuals as the key to true change. Although Zeng and the CYP advocated a modern political ideology and formed a modern political party, they could not totally break with the traditions of the Chinese intellectual heritage. This is important, because it limited their practical involvement in revolutionary tactics.

The campaigns against the ECCO by the CYP were effective, in some degree, in diminishing the positive response to the ECCO among young Chinese intellectuals. They provided a real ideological alternative and an active, feisty political leadership. Yet, the CYP was in many ways a feeble
shadow in the cataclysmic Chinese political environment. With the escalation of violence, foreign invasion, and civil war, there was no opportunity for a revolution based on a nationalist ideology which sought to harmonize classes and promote economic autonomy and national education. Events moved too quickly to allow consolidation of power in the hands of an intellectual leadership. Ironically, in terms of the Chinese generational revolt during the early 1920s, the CYP contained some of the most astute and well-informed patriots. The paradox was that by aspiring to a cultural restoration, the CYP de facto exemplified the political restraints of the traditional intellectual role, which precluded any chance to obtain power to implement their modern reformation of the Chinese state. Because their ideological horizons were rooted in the past, they became frozen in time. While they were walking to the revolution, the revolution ran right by them.

Notes

1. Zeng Qi, Zeng Muhan xiansheng yizhu (The Posthumous Works of Mr. Zeng Qi), in Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan (Collected Materials on Modern Chinese History), ed. Shen Yunlong, vol. 68 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, n.d.), Jiaan (Family Lessons), 287 (hereafter, Yizhu). He was not only a prolific journalist, but also an ardent diarist. See vol. 94 in the same series: Zeng Muhan xiansheng riji xuan (Selections From Mr. Zeng Qi’s Diary) (hereafter, Riji xuan). The July 1976 issue of Zhongguo wenxue (Biographical Literature) contains several articles commemorating him.


3. Zeng Qi, "Xuehui wenti zatan" (A Random Discussion of the Association’s Problems), Shaoqin Zhongguo, 3, no. 8 (1922): 76-80.

4. Zhou Taixuan, "Guanyu canji faqi Shaoqin Zhongguo Xuehui de huiyi" (Recollections of Participating in the Founding of the Young China Association), in Zhang Yunhou, Yan Xuyi, Hong Qingshang, and Wang Yunkai, comps., Wusi shi de shehui (The Organizations of the May Fourth Period), 4 vols. (Beijing: Sanlian, 1979), 1:536-49.


7. Zeng Qi, "Lubie Shaoqin Zhongguo Xuehui tongren zhehui fu Fa de yuanyi" (A Farewell Explanation on Going to France for Compatriots of the Young China Association), Shaoqin Zhongguo, 1, no. 3 (1919): 50-51.


9. This series of articles, published originally in Xinwen bao, are reproduced in FFSI, vol. 1. Interestingly, although sympathetic to the WSM, these articles are published in small print in appendices.

10. This special issue, published in October 1920, included an array of interviews, articles, and translations. Li Huang wrote overviews of French social studies and literature, as well as a report on an interview with the artist, Charles Albert. He Luzhi penned a short biography of Jean Jaures and translated a story by Guy de Maupassant. Zhou Taixuan gave a lengthy survey of French literature and translated a poetry. Li Jieren’s article on the Louvre included descriptions of various salles and pictures of art objects. Duan Zibian explored the work of the French mathematician, Gaston Darboux, and Hua Lin reviewed the fine arts. There was an article by Hu Zhu on living in Montargis with a French family, while Li Shicun also described scenes from Montargis, in his reflections on French civilization.


12. Ibid., 67-70.

13. Writing to Mao Zedong on 13 August 1920, the New People’s Study Society leader, Cai Hesen, mentioned that he had spoken to members of many of the other Chinese organizations in France. He linked a discussion with Zeng Qi about a characterization of "the more elite youth" [gongmi yuqian qingnian], and reported: "I spoke in depth with Zeng Muhan about this intention [of creating a Communist Party in France], and we were both very moved. I dare predict it will not be long before this exerts an influence on the members of the Young China Association... It seems as if a Chinese Communist Party will be established in this place under a new, fresh banner," Cai Hesen wenji (The Collected Writings of Cai Hesen) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), 52.


17. Ibid., 771.

18. 5 July 1923 entry in Zeng, Riji xuan, 55.
19. It is probable that Zeng was one of those who introduced Zhao to the YCA. This is difficult to prove, because Zhao’s entry was not announced in either Shaonian Zhongguo or Shaonian shijie (World of Youth). Zhao was one of the young members of the Association, but had proved his mettle by serving as the May Fourth Movement representative from his high school and concurrently publishing three newspapers during 1919.

20. Zheng Chaolin, interview by author, Shanghai, 25 October 1985; Sheng Cheng, interviews by author, Beijing, 12 and 18 October 1985. See also the numerous memoirs of Zhao in Zhongguo shenhui kaoyan yanjiushi (Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), comp., Yida qianhou (Before and After the Founding of the CCP), vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980).


22. For a partial history of the CYP, see Chun Lau Ki-ching, The Chinese Youth Party, 1923-1945, Centre for Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs no. 9 (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1972). Two useful memoirs by CYP members are Hu Guowei, Baiyi xinying (Impressions of Paris), 2nd ed. (Taipei: Puti chubanshe, 1970) and Li Huang, Xuedun shi huiylu, which was published in serial form in Zhuanji weneza in 1970 and in book form by the same publishers in 1978.

23. For several CYP platforms and memoirs, see Zhongguo qingnian dang dangshi ziliao (Materials on the History of the Chinese Youth Party) (Taipei: Minzu qiaoshi, 1955). The CYP proposed parallel much of Barres’ final political platform. Robert Soucy, in his insightful study of Barres, details several political programs and this important French fascist. See his Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barres (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).


25. See “Zhongguo qingnian dang dangshi dangmeng zhuanhangao” (Special Issue Making Public the Name of the Chinese Youth Party), Xiansheng zhoubao (The Pioneer Weekly) (Paris), no. 311. In reality, this secrecy did not derive anyone, and although it was often referred to as the Nationalist Clique—more often, by its opponents, with epithets like “running dogs”—one finds numerous references to it as the CYP.


27. Scholars in both the Republic of China and Hong Kong are beginning to conclude that the CYP was supported by warlords. For example, Chen Zhengzhang, who is writing a history of the party, has found proof that Zeng Qi and Li Huang were directly linked with Zhang ZuoLin and that fellow CYP members had connections with other warlords. Interview by author, Taipei, 10 July 1990.

28. Several of these ECCO articles, including some of the earliest writings of Deng Xiaoping, have been published in FFSL. For example, see Wu Hao [Zhou Enlai], "Shibua de fang'an" (Anti-Truth), Chiquang 3 (May 1924): 265-66; Xi Xian [Deng Xiaoping], "Qing kan xiansheng' zhoubao zhi disi zaoyao de xinwen" (Please See the Fourth Bunch of Lies about the News in the "Pioneer" Weekly), Chiquang 3 (January 1925): 273-74.

29. Zhao Ming, "Guojiazhuyizhe guqin xuejiu 'genming'" (The Touted "Revolution" of the Nationalists), Chiquang 55 (1930): 15-16. It should be noted that the CYP was also criticized by the GMD Right for their warlord connections throughout the decade.

30. Bi Yinglin, "Ou' pian yingzuo er youtuo neng buezuo de wenhang" (An Essay of "Criticism Which Should not be Written, But Which Must be Written), Fendou (Struggle), no. 30 (1926): 8-16.

31. See, for example, "Guojiazhuyizhe zitao meiqu" (The Lack of Interest in the Self-Analysis of the Nationalist [Clique]), Fendou, no. 37 (1926): 4-5; "Yingzuo (??) sanzhizhi shil" (The Power of Several Essays!), Fendou, no. 30 (1926): 16.

32. See the original declaration of the CYP (n. 25 above), as well as that in Xingshi zhoubao (The Awakened Lion Weekly) 1, no. 1 (1924): 1-2. Numerous articles on nationalism by CYP members praised the unification of Germany and often linked the example of the Young Italians with that of the Young Turks (see, e.g., n. 24). In 1983, the Central Party Section of the CYP in Taiwan published a two-volume reprint edition of Xingshi zhoubao.

33. Zeng Qi, "Gongchandang puming guojiazhuyizhe zhi zelu" (The Pict by the Chinese Communist Party to Destroy the Nationalists), in Zeng, Yizhu, 90-91.


35. See William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), particularly chap. 6: "Fragility, Fascism, and ‘New Life’." Lloyd Eastman’s article, "The Rise and Fall of the ‘Blue Shirts’: A Review Article," Republican China 13 (November 1987): 25-48, poses a salient question on the difference between fascist ideology and action when he asks "whether a group employing fascist methods for their ‘mobilizing and control capabilities’ was any less fascist because it advocated the Three People’s Principles than if it advocated the racism of Das Volks or the imperial principle of kokutai."


38. Zeev Sternhell, Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France, trans. David Maisel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 248. Most other studies of fascism in Europe also point to youth; for example, the importance of a youth cohort in the rise of Hitler is explored by Peter Loewenberg, "The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort," in his Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach (New


42. Soucy, chap. 7; Sternhell, chaps. 1, 5.


44. Hu Guowei, 24-25.

45. Teng Hiao-King, "Lettre a M. Li Hoang," *La Chine*, 11-12, in Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Asie Serie E Chine 492. There is a fascinating passage where Deng quotes the eloquent German nationalist Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) on the necessity for discipline and order.